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Abstract
In addition to the conventional linear cointegration test, this paper tests the asymmetry
relationship between ﬁscal revenue and expenditure, by making a distinction between the ad-
justment of positive (budget surplus) and negative (budget deﬁcit) deviations from equilibrium.
T h ea n a l y s i su s e sq u a r t e r l yd a t af o rS o u t hA f r i c a . The paper reveals that government authorities
in South Africa are more likely to react fast when the budget is in deﬁcit than when in surplus,
and that the stabilisation measures used by government are fairly neutral at low deﬁcit levels;
that is, at deﬁcit levels of 4% of GDP and below. We conclude that an attempt to achieve ﬁscal
sustainability via a reduction in expenditure on sectors conducive to economic growth might be
prone to create social and political shocks, which could render such ﬁscal policy unsustainable.
In South Africa the main ﬁscal challenge, therefore, is to ﬁnd ways through which the recent
gains in ﬁscal solvency can be consolidated.
Keywords smooth transition error correction model; nonlinearity; government intertemporal
budget constraint; and ﬁscal sustainability.
JEL classiﬁcation C22 C51 H62
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Developments which followed the sub-prime crisis have led to renewed debate on ﬁscal sustainability:
The massive degree of ﬁscal intervention, with corresponding increases in deﬁcits and debt, are a
concern. From a ﬁscal perspective, maintaining a stable long-term relation between expenditures and
revenues is one of the key requirements for a stable macroeconomic environment and a sustainable
economy. Sustainability, in general, concerns current and expected policies. If economic agents do
not expect current and future policies to operate within the inter-temporal budget constraint, then
the ﬁscal process would be unsustainable and government insolvency possible.
Several of the empirical studies on ﬁscal sustainability, however, focus on the time series behaviour
of tax revenues and expenditures, as well as debt series, to investigate whether the behaviour of these
series is consistent with the inter-temporal budget balance. The empirical results of these studies
vary depending on the sample period and the methodology used. In the United States, Cunado,
Gil-Alana, and Perez de Gracia (2004), Hamilton and Flavin (1986), and Trehan and Walsh (1988)
failed to reject the inter-temporal budget balance, whilst Hakkio and Rush (1991) Wilcox (1989)
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1and others, rejected it. Empirical investigations into government’s inter-temporal ﬁscal solvency
constraints in East Asia have also been documented (see for example, Baharumshah and Lau 2007).
Based on time series analysis and quarterly data over three decades, Baharumshah and Lau (2007)
found evidence of sustainable ﬁscal ﬁnances in Thailand and South Korea, whilst the Philippines
and Malaysia demonstrated only ‘weak sustainability’. Baharumshah and Lau (2007) showed that
in Singapore, revenue was growing at a faster rate than government spending.
In South Africa, issues of ﬁscal sustainability received greater attention in the 1980s and 1990s
following a growing public debt/GDP ratio. In the earlier and mid-1990s, several researchers argued
that ﬁscal policy was unsustainable in South Africa (Roux 1993; Van der Merwe 1994; Schoeman
1994; Cronje 1995). Roux (1993) argued that the South African government would be able to ﬁnance
higher social expenditure only if economic growth improved; otherwise, debt-ﬁnanced increases in
social expenditure would cause an increase in the public debt/GDP ratio. Van der Merwe (1994)
argued that ﬁscal policy in South Africa is unsustainable due to the large gap between real interest
rates and real economic growth as well as the relatively large size of the deﬁcit. Schoeman (1994)
also warned that as long as government runs a large deﬁcit in the face of a real interest rate that
exceeds the real economic growth, the public debt/GDP ratio would tend to explode.
Consistent with the ﬁndings of the various researchers in South Africa, the South African economy
embarked on broadly three phases of ﬁscal reform since 1994.
From 1994 to 1996, following a period of recession and a rapid rise in the budget deﬁcit, Gov-
ernment’s Reconstruction and Development Programme was phased into departmental plans and
budgets, and a comprehensive reprioritisation of public expenditure was undertaken (Manuel, 2004).
The average budget deﬁcit stood at 4.3% of GDP and government debt was approaching 50% of
GDP by 1994.
Ap e r i o do fﬁscal consolidation from 1997 to 2000 saw the introduction of medium term expendi-
ture planning, substantial investment in tax reform and revenue administration capacity and eﬃcient
coordination of ﬁscal and monetary policy. The budget deﬁcit declined to 3.0% of GDP, public debt
relative to GDP declined from 49.7% in 1994 to 44.4% in 2000 and average borrowing costs decreased
sharply, providing room for government to spend more on social services and infrastructure.
From 2001 to 2008, the government of South Africa adopted a more expansionary ﬁscal stance
in support of its infrastructure investment and social welfare improvement drive. Despite this ex-
pansionary stance of government, the main budget revenue increased consistently from 22.5% of
GDP in 2002 to 26.6% of GDP in 2007 and declined slightly to 26.3% of GDP in 2008. Expenditure
remained around 26% of GDP and increased slightly to 26.9% of GDP in 2008. As a result, budget
deﬁcits declined from 2001 to 2005 and a budget surplus was recorded in 2006 and 2007. For 2008,
the budget returned to a deﬁcit of 0.6% of GDP (See ﬁg.1).
Although government had achieved a substantial reduction in its budget deﬁcit target, from 6.8%
of GDP in 1993 to 0.6% in 2008, the scenario has meanwhile changed again (see Budget Review
2010), mainly due to the slowdown in the world economy which also aﬀected the revenue base of
the South African economy. However, the policy of ﬁscal prudence during the period 2003 to 2008
resulted in a substantial decline in real debt service cost, while the real growth rate of the economy
increased considerably. Nevertheless, the former still exceeds the growth rate, resulting in a (r-g)
gap1. Furthermore, it appears that public debt and budget deﬁcit reductions have been achieved at
the expense of a relative reduction in service delivery expenditure, as is evident in the reduction in
the ratio of education expenditure to GDP from an average of 6.21% during the period 1990-1999,
to an average of 5.6% during the period 2000—2008; and a reduction in health expenditure relative
to GDP from an average of 2.93% during 1990-1999 to 2.84% during 2000-20082.
In most of the studies recorded in the literature on ﬁscal measures to address the solvency
condition, researchers have either tested for linear stationarity in the total government deﬁcit series
or tested for linear cointegration between total government spending and total tax revenues. To
1See Burger, Philippe, 2003, Sustainable Fiscal Policy and Economic Stability, Theory and Practice.
2Although in nominal terms allocations have increased in the case of social services, like health and education.
2the best of our understanding, few researchers have used non-linear techniques to quantify the
adjustment process of ﬁscal and other macroeconomic variables towards the long-run equilibrium
(see Van Dijk Dick & Franses and Philip Hans (1997), Hansen and Kim (1996), Kunst (1992,
1995) Dwyer (1996) Swanson(1996) and Cipollini (2001)). In South Africa in particular, no study
has tested whether the error-correction process used in the respective studies is linear. Instead,
previous studies have assumed that the adjustment process driving the variables toward equilibrium
is linear; i.e. adjustment towards equilibrium is always present and of the same strength under all
circumstances. In this study the authors want to point out that there are situations in which the
validity of this assumption might be questioned (see Van Dijk etal. 1997).
The authors therefore apply an extension of the linear inter-temporal budget constraint rule of
ﬁscal sustainability to a regime-switching framework, where the transition from one regime to the
other occurs in a smooth way. The switching between regimes is controlled by the state of the ﬁscal
balance. This feature of the smooth transition model allows us to test the ability of high against low
budget deﬁcits or surpluses to best describe the non-linear dynamics of ﬁscal policy in South Africa.
Following the introduction, Section II presents sustainability criteria as obtained from the litera-
ture. Section III provides the estimation procedures, with both linear and non-linear speciﬁcations;
Section VI presents the results from the estimations and the last section summarises and concludes.
2 Sustainability Criteria
The most straightforward way to assess the ﬁscal sustainability position is to start from a govern-
ment’s inter-temporal budget constraint. The budget constraint looks at the long-run relationship
between government revenue and expenditure (that covers the total government spending on goods
and services, transfer payments and interest on debts). For simplicity, assume that budget deﬁcits
are ﬁnanced using bonds with a maturity of one period. This implies that the government faces the
budget constraint as shown in equation one:
Gt +( 1+rt)Bt−1 = Rt + Bt (1)
Where G is government expenditure, r is the one-period real rate of interest, R is government revenue











(1 + rt+1)−1Bt+s (2)
We assume that the real interest rate is stationary with unconditional mean given by r and also that
the growth rate of the real supply of bonds, on average, is equal to or lower than the average rate
of interest[see Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Haug (1995)]. With these assumptions, we can have
the following expression:
lim
s→∞(1 + r)−sBt+s =0 (3)
The above equation (3) states that the debt stock, when measured in present value terms, vanishes
in the limit. By deﬁnition, it excludes Ponzi ﬁnancing; that is, the government is not ‘bubble’-
ﬁnancing its expenditure by issuing new debt to ﬁnance the deﬁcit. This is equivalent to saying
that the deﬁcit is sustainable if and only if the stock of debt held by the public is expected to grow
n of a s t e rt h a nt h em e a nr e a lr a t eo fi n t e r e s t ,w h i c hi sv i e w e da sap r o x yf o rt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ft h e
economy (Baharumshah 2007).
Following equation (3), the inter-temporal budget constraint, equation (2), can be re-written as;
Gt − Rt =
∞ X
s=0
(1 + r)−s+1(∆Rt+s − ∆Gt + r∆Bt+s−1) (4)
3The inter-temporal budget constraint, under the no-Ponzi scheme rule, imposes restrictions on the
time series properties of government expenditure and revenue given by the right hand side of equation
4. This will be stationary, as long as government expenditure, revenue and the stock of debt are all
stationary in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Speciﬁcally, if Gt are Rt I(1), they will be cointegrated, implying that
there exists an error-correction mechanism pushing government ﬁnances towards the levels required
by the inter-temporal budget constraint.
Assuming that the transversality condition for the budget constraint holds and the limit term
in equation (3) is zero, we arrive at the following cointegrating relationship as shown in equation 5
(see Hakkio and Rush 1991);
Rt = α + βGt + εt (5)
Following Martin (2000), the deﬁcit is ‘strongly’ sustainable (strong solvency) if and only if the I(1)
process of R and G are cointegrated and β=1. The deﬁcit is only ‘weakly’ sustainable if R and
G are cointegrated and 0<β< 1 (see Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Quintos, 1995). The linear model
estimated in this paper, after eliminating insigniﬁcant lags, is speciﬁed as:
dlrevt = α0 + α1dlrev−1 + α2dlrev−2 + α3dlrev−4 + α4dlrev−5 + α5dlrev−8 + α6 expt
+α7dlexp−2 +α8dlexp−4 +α9dlexp−5 +α10dlexp−8 +α11ecm−1 (6)
3S p e c i ﬁcation and Estimation Techniques
In this paper, our empirical estimation involves the following steps: i) testing for stationarity of the
variables; ii) testing for cointegration and estimation of the cointegrating relation; iii) testing for
non-linearity of the adjustment process; and IV) estimating and evaluating of the Smooth Transition
Error Correction model.
3.1 Linear estimation techniques
We carry out three diﬀerent tests for the order of integration which are: the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (1981), the Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidst and Shin (1992) and the Phillips- Perron (1990)
tests. The Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests have as their null hypothesis that the dynamics
of the respective series are characterised by a unit root. The Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidst and
Shin test, on the other hand, is based on the null of stationarity. The use of three tests is justiﬁed
since Perron (1989, 1997) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) have demonstrated that the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test has low power in the presence of a structural break.
We consider those cointegration tests that are most popular among researchers: the residual-
based test suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) and the Likelihood Ratio test introduced by Jo-
hansen (1988). Given a bi-variate case (for simplicity) with no deterministic regressors, the residual-
based test for cointegration is performed via the two-step procedure of Engle and Granger (1987).
That is, we ﬁrst estimate the cointegration regression as speciﬁed in equation (6) using ordinary
least square (OLS) and second, test for the presence of a unit root in the regression residuals.
yt = −βxt + ut (7)
Johansen (1988) advocates a test for cointegration by testing the rank r of π by applying likelihood
ratio tests to test the signiﬁcance of the squared partial canonical correlations between ∆yt and
yt−1denoted ˆ λ1and ˆ λ2 which can be obtained by solving a generalised eigenvalue problem. The
authors use trace tests to test H0 : r = r0 against the alternative hypothesis H1 : r ≥ r0+1 for r0 =
0, 1.
This paper considers both non-parametric and parametric tests for linearity. The non-parametric
test follows Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (1987). It tests the null hypothesis of independence and
identically distributed variables against an unspeciﬁed alternative. The Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman
4(1987) test cannot test chaos directly, but only non-linearity, provided that any linear dependence has
been removed from the data (e.g. using traditional ARIMA-type models or using ﬁrst diﬀerences).
The Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (1987) statistics are, therefore, diﬀerent from other non-parametric
test statistics since these focuses mainly on either the second- or third-order properties of x2.T h e
basic idea of the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (1987) test is to make use of a ‘correlation integral’
popular in chaotic time series analysis. Given a k-dimensional time series and observations{xt}
TK
t=1,
deﬁne the correlation integral as3.





Where Iδ(u,v) is an indicator variable that equals one if ||u-v||<δ, and zero otherwise, and where
||·||is sup norm. The null hypothesis of the BDS test is that the series is linear and the alternative
hypothesis is that the time series is non-linear after removing any linear dependence from the data,
either by using ARIMA-type models or taking the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the series. This test statistic
has a standard normal limiting distribution.
The parametric test for linearity follows Tersvirta (1994) who suggests a method of approximating
the transition function by a Taylor expansion about the null of linearity γ = 0. The linearity test











t−d + εt (9)
Where
wt =( 1 ,∆yt−1,........................∆yt−p,∆xt−p,z t−d)
0
ˆ wt =( ∆yt−1.........................∆yt−p,∆xt−1.......∆xt−p,z t−d)
The original null hypothesis of linearity, H0: γ = 0 is equivalent to the hypothesis that all coeﬃcients
of the auxiliary regressors ˆ wtz
j
t−d, j = 1,2 ,3 are zero i.e.H0 : φ1 = φ2 = φ3 =0 . For details on the
LM-type test for this hypothesis, see Van Dijk et al. (1997). To select the most appropriate lag of
z to use as transition variable, the test should be carried out for a number of diﬀerent values of d,
say d =1 ,...D. If the linearity is rejected for several values of d, the one with the smallest p-value
is selected as the transition variable; see Van Dijk et al. (1997).
3.2 Non-linear estimation technique
If the linearity hypothesis is rejected, we can estimate a non-linear model using non-linear least
squares (NLS). In this paper, we apply the smooth-transition threshold models (Granger and
Tersvirta, 1993; Tersvirta, 1994; Tersvirta, 1998) which allow for smooth transition between regimes
of behaviour and thus generalise the threshold autoregressive model (TAR). The other strength of
the smooth transition model is that it is theoretically more appealing than the simple TAR models
that impose an abrupt switch in parameter values. An abrupt switch only happens if all agents act
simultaneously. Additionally, the STR model allows diﬀerent types of market behaviour depend-
ing on the nature of the transition function. In particular, the logistics function allows diﬀering
behaviour depending on whether deviations from equilibrium are positive or negative, whilst the
exponential function allows diﬀering behaviour to occur for large and small deviations regardless of
sign (see McMillan, 2004). Following McMillan, the STR model is given by equation 9 below:
∆xt = δ0 +
p X
i=1
∆xt−i + ρ1ut−1 +( θi +
p X
i=1
θi∆xt−i + ρ2ut−1)F(ut−1)+εt (10)
3See Tsay (2005). Analysis of Financial Times Series, Second edition P. 210.
5Where F(ut−d) is the transition function and ut−d the transition variable. The logistic function is
given as follows, with the full model thus referred to as a logistic STR (or LSTR) model:
F(ut−1)={1+e x p [ −γ(ut−1 − τ)]}−1 γ> 0 (11)
Which allows a smooth transition between the diﬀering dynamics of positive and negative devi-
ations, where γ is the smoothing parameter and τ the transition parameter. This function allows
the parameters to change monotonically with ut−1.A sγ →∞ ,F ( u t−1) becomes a Heaviside
function, F(ut−1)=0 ,(ut−1) ≤ τ,F(ut−1)=1 ,(ut−1) ≥ τ and equation 9 reduces to a TAR model.
As γ → 0, equation 9 becomes a linear model of order p.
The second type of asymmetry, which distinguishes between small and large equilibrium errors, is
obtained when is taken to be the exponential, with the resulting model referred to as the exponential
STR (or ESTR) model and ESTECM for a bivariate model:
F(ut−1)=1− exp[−γ(ut−1 − τ)2 (12)
Equation 9 results in gradual changing strength of adjustment for larger (both positive and negative)
deviations from equilibrium. It implies that the dynamics of the middle ground diﬀer from those of
the larger deviations. This model is therefore only able to capture non-linear symmetric adjustment.
A possible drawback of this choice for the transition function is that both if γ → 0o rγ →∞,
the model becomes linear. This can be avoided by using the ‘quadratic logistic function’ as proposed
by Jansen and Tersvirta (1996).
F(ut−1)=( 1+e x p {−γ(ut−1 − τ1)(ut−1 − τ2)})−1 (13)
In this case, if γ → 0, the model becomes linear, whilst if γ →∞ , the function F(.) is equal to 1 for
ut−1 <c 1 and ut−1 >c 2.
The STR model is estimated using the non-linear least squares; however in the LSTR model, a
large γ results in a steep slope of the transition function at τ, thus a large number of observations is
required to estimate γ accurately. Furthermore, convergence of γ may be slow, with relatively large
changes in γ having only a minor eﬀect upon the shape of the transition function. To get around this
problem, Granger and Tersvirta (1993) and Tersvirta (1994) proﬀer scaling the smoothing parameter
γ by the standard deviation of the transition variable, and by the variance of the transition variable
in the case of ESTR (see McMillan, 2004).
4 Data Discussion
The data used to estimate the model suggested in this paper consists of the South African national
government receipts and expenditures, expressed as ratios of GDP. The data, obtained from the
Quarterly Bulletin published by the South African Reserve Bank, are quarterly, from 1960:1 to
2008:4. All variables have been expressed as a percentage of GDP and converted into their natural
logarithmic form. We use revenue and expenditure ratios to GDP since government authorities are
mainly concerned with the dynamics of the diﬀerent budget items relative to the overall size of the
economy (see Hakkio and Rush, 1991; Cipollini, 2001)
5 Empirical results
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root tests as well as the
Kwiatkowski—Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) stationarity tests for both series are reported in table
1. We note that the null of a unit root cannot be rejected on the basis of Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(1981) and Phillips-Perron (1989) for both series. This result is supported by the Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) test as this test rejects the null of stationarity for both series. There
6is no ambiguity in the order of integration; therefore we use the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the series in our
study. The Granger Causality test (see table 2) gives an indication of a unidirectional causality from
expenditure to taxes, i.e. supports the expenditure dominance hypothesis, implying that in South
Africa budget developments are mainly determined by government spending4 A residual-based test
of cointegration as suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) and the likelihood ratio test introduced
by Johansen (1991), show evidence of a long -run relation between the two variables of interest
(see ﬁg. 6). We test the hypothesis that the co-integrating vector is (1, -1). Since the ρ-value is
not signiﬁcant at the conventional levels we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions
are binding (see table 3), implying that during the sample period, ﬁscal policy in South Africa,
consistent with the inter-temporal condition of sustainability, was sustainable.
The ﬁtted linear conditional error-correction model for revenue to GDP is shown in table 6,
column 1. The linear model seems quite satisfactory, with the post-estimation residual tests indi-
cating normality but with evidence of heteroscedasticity. The LM-tests reject the null of no serial
correlation. It may be that these signiﬁcant test values are caused by neglected non-linearity (Van
Dijk etal. 2001).
5.1 Linearity testing and model selection
We carry out the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (1987) test on a series of estimated residuals to check
whether the residuals are independent and identically distributed; i.e. whether the residuals from
our linear model has any non-linear dependence in the series after the linear model has been ﬁtted.
Table 4 indicates that all the test statistics are signiﬁcantly greater than the critical values. Thus,
we should reject the null hypothesis of independent and identically distributed series/variables. The
results strongly suggest that the time series in our model are non-linearly dependent, which is one
of the indications of chaotic behavior.
We also consider a parametric test, the Escribano and Jorda (EJ hereafter) (2001) linearity LM
test. The null hypothesis in this test, , is that the series follows a stationary linear process. The
computation of the test is carried out using the F- version, which is an asymptotic Wald test.
Computing the LM-type test statistics, and setting delay variable (d) equal to 1 through 8, it is
seen that linearity is rejected for d=1, 2, 6 and 8 at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance. But given that
d=6 has the smallest ρ-value, we select it as the delay variable (see table 5). This implies that in
South Africa it takes 6 quarters or one and a half years for ﬁscal policy changes to be eﬀective. This
is not uncommon, as ﬁscal policy issues require legislature procedures, which take time. Deciding
between the transition functions can be done by a short sequence of tests nested within. This
testing is motivated by the observation that if a logistics alternative is appropriate, the second-order
derivative in the Taylor expansion (8b) is zero (see Van Dijk, 1997). The null hypothesis to be tested
is as follows:
H03 : φ3 =0 ;H02 : φ2 =0 | : φ3 =0 ;H01 : φ1 =0 |φ3 = φ2 =0
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) suggest carrying out all three tests, independent of rejection or
acceptance of the ﬁrst or second test, and using the outcomes to select the appropriate transition
function. The decision rule is to select an exponential STR function only if the p-value corresponding
to H02is the smallest, and select the logistic function in all other cases. Table 5 shows that at d=6,
the logistic representation of the data is the most preferred.
4The authors recognise that Granger causality is diﬀerent from a test for exogeneity (Enders, 2004). Whilst
exogeneity of one variable, say, expenditure means that it is not aﬀected by contemporaneous values of the remaining
variables (taxes, debt etc), Granger causality refers only to the eﬀects of past values of those variables on the current
value of expenditure. Our causality result reported only gives an indication of the relationship which is not ﬁrmed
because it is not the focus of the paper. Studies have shown that causality amongst variables are highly sensitive to
the methodologies used, choice of variables, the frequency of the data, and also the sample period (see Ndahiriwe and
Gupta 2007)
75.2 LSTECM estimation
Having established a non-linear relationship we now estimate the parameters of the LSTECM by
using the non-linear least squares (NLS) technique. Two LSTECM models are ﬁtted, one is general
and the other is ﬁtted after parameter reduction (see table 6, columns 3 and 4); this is obtained by
removing the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. The model estimated is speciﬁed as:


























Where the weight F is modelled as follows:
F(ecmt−d) ≡ F(ecmt−d;γ,c)={1+e x p [ −γ(ecmt−d − τ)]}−1 γ> 0
The parameter γ which determines the smoothness of the transition regime is set at 10; and the
threshold is computed to be at 0.04. As stated earlier, the delay variable (d) is computed to be at 6
quarters i.e. one and a half years. We also follow Granger and Tersvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994)
in making γ dimension-free by dividing it by the standard deviation of σ ecmt−d.A s t h e s u r p l u s
grows larger, ecmt−d →∞ ,F→ 1. As the budget deﬁcit grows increasingly larger, ecmt−d →− ∞ ,
F → 0. When F →0 implying (1- F) = 1, i.e. a budget deﬁcit, the relevant parameters are a
summation over α and β.
The results from estimating model equation (13) are presented in table 6. Table 6 columns 3 and
4 report the non-linear least square estimates of our models. Tests of the residuals show no residual
autocorrelation, no serial correlation, no non-normality of residuals and, ﬁnally, no heteroscedasticity.
The Akaike information criterion shows that the non-linear model (i.e. model 3) is a better ﬁtt h a n
the linear model. The error-correction terms are of the expected signs and statistically signiﬁcant
and show that the adjustment process to equilibrium is faster when the government budget is in
deﬁcit than in surplus. In short, government authorities are likely to react faster when the budget
deﬁcit exceeds 4% of GDP, since it will create concern for the achievement of ﬁscal sustainability.
The one-and-a-half-year reaction delay (i.e. d = 6) combined with a relatively smooth switch from
one regime to the other γ =10, can be explained in terms of the political-institutional processes (see
Cipollini, 2001). Fiscal laws and regulations are drafted, through a budget document and tabled
to parliament for approval before implementation, a process that could be time consuming. The
empirical result shows that a 1% increase in the government budget deﬁcit (the transition variable)
implies variation in the transition function that is larger (i.e. a stronger policy maker reaction) than
the corresponding 1% increase in a budget surplus5, showing that in this phase the South African
government becomes more concerned about solvency or ﬁscal sustainability. However, it appears that
ﬁscal sustainability in South Africa has been attained at the expense of a reduction in the ratio of
expenditure to GDP on education, and a relatively constant ratio of expenditure to GDP on health,
during the deﬁcit and surplus ﬁscal regimes (see ﬁgures 2 and 4). Whilst the ratio of expenditure to
GDP on these sectors were declining both during the budget deﬁcit and surplus regimes, expenditure
t oG D Po ns o c i a lp r o t e c t i o na n dp u b l i co r d e ra n ds a f e t yi n c r e a s e di nb o t hr e g i m e s( s e eﬁgures 3 and
5). This result is supported by the negative correlation between the thresholds (i.e. budget deﬁcit
and surplus regimes) and the trend of education and health expenditure to GDP (see tables 7a and
b). A priori one would expect that such a decline in the allocations to sectors which could stimulate
growth and which in turn could generate future revenue, may pose a threat to the accumulated ﬁscal
space.
5Figures 7 and 8 shows the state dependent speed of adjustment over time
86 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has tested the asymmetry relationship between revenue and expenditure, by making a
distinction between adjustment of positive (budget surplus) and negative (budget deﬁcit) deviations
from equilibrium. It uses quarterly data on South Africa. Our ﬁndings suggest that ﬁscal policy
over the sampled period has been sustainable, since the historical processes in South Africa are
consistent with the intertemporal government budget constraint. Of more importance, our ﬁndings
show that the assumption that adjustment towards equilibrium is always present and of the same
strength under all circumstances, is not valid in the case of ﬁscal data on South Africa.
Results from the study also reveal that government authorities are likely to react faster when the
budget is in deﬁcit than when in surplus, implying that the South African government becomes more
concerned about solvency or ﬁscal sustainability in the case of the former. This adjustment could be
prone to social shock, as trend expenditure on education and health to GDP has been on a decline
over this period of ﬁscal solvency. The paper therefore supports the view that sustainability is more
than ﬁscal accounting to include social and political context, especially for emerging economies like
South Africa where the role of government is socially and politically important6.It concludes that
the attempt to achieve ﬁscal sustainability via a reduction in the expenditure/GDP ratios on sectors
which could be potentially growth enhancing and therefore expand the revenue base, may be socially,
politically and economically unsustainable.
7 Future Research
Future research requires estimating the revenue gap in the South African economy to ascertain
whether there is potential for revenue growth, in order to reduce the backlog in service provision —
a situation which is identiﬁed as a potential threat to current ﬁscal stability.
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12Table 1: Unit Roots Tests 
Panel A: in Levels  ADF  PP  KPSS 
Revenue-GDP  1.42  -0.598  1.599*** 
Expenditure-GDP  0.906  -0.300  1.307*** 
Panel  B:  first 
difference 
     
Revenue-GDP  -9.665***  -9.998**  0.095 
Expenditure-GDP  -10.132***  -7.528***  0.092 
Note *(**)(***) denotes significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 2:  Granger Causality Test 
Null hypothesis                                                     Obs                F-Statistic                      Prob. 
Dlrevgdp does not Granger cause Dlexpgd      188                    1.34                               0.25 
Dlexpgdp does not Granger Cause Dlrevgdp                             2.17                              0.054 
 
Table 3: Binding Restrictions 
  B(1,1)=1, B(1,2) =-1   








1  452.0105  0.219771  1  0.639215 
 
Table 4: BDS Test 
  Embedding Dimensions(m)  BDS Statistics 
2  2  0.014***(0.0045) 
2  3  0.024***(0.0071) 
2  4  0.040***(0.0085) 
2  5  0.046***(0.0087) 
2  6  0.046***(0.0085) 






Table 5: LM-Type for non-linearity and model selection 
Transition 
Variable  
LM  H01  H02  H03 
Ecm-1  0.018  0.018  0.043  0.025 
Ecm-2  0.706  0.706  0.240  0.558 
Ecm-3  0.448  0.448  0.140  0.680 
Ecm-4  0.113  0.113  0.205  0.446 
Ecm-5  0.144  0.144  0.068  0.090 
Ecm-6  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.0012 
Ecm-7  0.421  0.421  0.507  0.957 
Ecm-8  0.001  0.0011  0.0010  0.124 
Note:  -values  of  F  variants  of  the  LM-type  tests  used  in  the  specification  procedure  of  Escribano  and 
Jorda(2001). 
 
In-sample estimates of linear and nonlinear  models 
)
)( 1 (
1 11 8 10 5 9
4 8 2 7 6 8 5 5 4 4 3 2 2
1 1 0 1 11 8 10 5 9 4 8 2 7
6 8 5 5 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 0
exp exp
exp exp exp exp
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14Table 6: Model Estimates, 1960: Q1- 2008: Q4 




α0  0.002      (0.005)  0.009        (0.008)  0.005         (0.008) 
α1  -0.28***(0.081)  -0.424*** (0.109)  -0.469***  (0.081) 
α2  0.102**  (0.047)  0.100*       (0.058)   
α3  0.478***(0.068)  0.507***   (0.088)  0.510***    (0.069) 
α4  0.227***(0.062)  0.334***   (0.089)  0.284***    (0.067) 
α5  0.199**  (0.060)  0.154**     (0.075)  0.173 ***    (0.059) 
α6  0.153**  (0.059)  0.136*       (0.078)  0.093**       (0.046) 
α7  -0.082** (0.041)  -0.132**    (0.056)  -0.108**     (0.054) 
α8  -0.145** (0.070)  -0.1534*   (0.087)   
α9  -0.213***(0.054)  -0.253***  (0.079)  -0.127*        (0.066) 
α10  0.008        (0.054)  0.023         (0.075)   
α11  -0.214***(0.061)  -0.165**   (0.077)  -0.121*        (0.072) 
β0    -0.058***  (0.021)  -0.058***    (0.019) 
β1    0.399**     (0.171)  0.326***      (0.019) 
β2    -0.085       (0.106)   
β3    -0.073       (0.151)   
β4    -0.111       (0.142)   
β5    0.126         (0.131)   
β6    0.103          (0.135)   
β7    0.148*       (0.089)  0.138*        (0.078) 
β8    -0.184        (0.160)  -0.220**     (0.094) 
β9    -0.131        (0.144)  -0.269**     (0.125) 
Β10    0.018         (0.112)   
β11    -0.342 **  (0.144)  -0.332***    (0.124) 
α6 +β6    0.239***   (0.012)   
α11 +β11    -0.507*** (0.0147)  -0.453***    (0.011) 
    -0.04  -0.04 
      10     10 
  0.90  0.91  0.92 
T  184  184  184 
AIC  -2.35  -2.34  -2.37 
ARCH  [0.0066]  [0.52]  [0.30] 
LM  [0.001]  [0.108]  [0.402] 
DW  2.10  2.09  2.06 
 
Note:  *(**)(***)  denotes  significance  at  10,  5  and  1%  respectively;  T-  No.  of  observations,  ARCH-  Autoregressive  conditional 
heteroscedasticity,  AIC-Akaike  info  criterion  ,DW-  Durbin  Watson  stat.  [  ]  are  probability  values.  The  Delta  method  is  used  to 
calculate the standard errors of (α6 +β6) and (α11 +β11) 
15Table 7a: Correlation between expenditure Items GDP and Deficit Regime 
  Deficit  Defence  Education  Health  Social 
protection 
Public 
order  & 
Safety 
Housing 
Deficit   1.0000  -0.1398  -0.475  -0.2373  0.1149  -0.0564  -0.2423 
Defence  -0.1398  1.0000  -0.5009  -0.5387  -0.9051  -0.9047  0.7138 
Education  -0.475  -0.5009  1.0000  0.7637  -0.4592  0.6585  -0.3971 
Health  -0.237  -0.5387  0.7637  1.0000  0.5580  0.6582  -0.2009 
Social 
Protection 




-0.0564  -0.9047  0.6585  0.6582  0.8987  1.0000  -0.5861 
Housing  -0.242  0.7138  -0.3971  -0.20092  -0.5650  -0.5861  1.0000 
 
Table 7b: Correlation between expenditure Items GDP and Surplus Regime 
  Surplus  Defence  Education  Health  Social 
protection 
Public 
order  & 
Safety 
Housing 
Surplus  1.0000  -0.4803  -0.2655  -0.0099  0.4964  0.4303  -0.1847 
Defence  -0.4803  1.0000  -0.5009  -0.5387  -0.9051  -0.9047  0.7138 
Education  -0.2655  -0.5009  1.0000  0.7634  -0.4592  0.6585  -0.3971 
Health  -0.0099  -0.5387  0.7634  1.0000  0.5580  0.6582  -0.2009 
Social 
Protection 




0.43030  -0.9047  0.658  0.6582  0.8987  1.0000  -58615 




   
16Appendix 1: Description of the variables and sources 
Variables  Description 
Revenue  National government revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product 
Expenditure  National government expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product 
Education  National  government  expenditure  on  education  as  a  percentage  of  gross  domestic 
product 
Health  National government expenditure on health as a percentage of gross domestic product 
Socialprotection  National government expenditure on social protection as percentage of gross domestic 
product 
Public  order  and 
safety 
National government expenditure on public order and  safety as percentage of  gross 
product product 
Housing  National government expenditure on housing as a percentage of gross domestic product 
Deficit   Expenditure greater tha revenue as a percentage  of gross domestic product 
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Figure 8: Time varying parameter, surplus regime 
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